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Abstract  
Do banks extract rent from depositors who hold older deposit accounts? This study addresses 
this question using product level data from the UK instant access (branch based) deposit 
market. In this context, two research questions related to the conditions necessary for 
differential pricing for existing and new customers are assessed. Specifically whether more 
mature deposit accounts have lower interest rates and does the newest deposit account in a 
firm’ portfolio pay an interest rate premium? Empirical support is provided for both 
questions, with interest rate setting for new and existing deposit accounts also found to be 
influenced by firm type. 
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The Influence of Product Age on Pricing Decisions: An examination of bank deposit 
interest rate setting. 
1. Introduction 
If depositors are unlikely to switch their bank, can banks extract rent from their existing 
depositors? This outcome of low customer switching (see Klemperer 1995) has been 
examined both for the US (Sharpe 1997, Hannan and Adams 2011) and Spanish banking 
markets (Carbo-Valverde et al 2011). These studies assessed the proportion of in-migration 
into different geographical regions to determine if these regions are characterised by 
relatively more or fewer new depositors. In all cases banks’ aggregate deposit interest rate 
setting improves with the degree of in-migration suggesting new customers receive better 
interest rates on deposit accounts than existing customers. This study extends this empirical 
literature through examining two further research questions emerging from an application of 
Klemperer’s (1995) model to the UK deposit market:  
1. Do more mature or older deposit accounts have lower interest rates and,  
2. Does the newest deposit account in a firms’ deposit account portfolio have an 
interest rate premium?  
 
Why would a link between the maturity of a deposit account and the interest rate occur? This 
departure from the law of one price was proposed by Klemperer (1995) in a multi-period 
model for a standard goods market. In the first time period, products will be introduced, 
marketed only to new customers and competitively priced if firms desire to extend market 
share. In subsequent time periods existing customers emerge and if the market displays real 
or perceived switching costs, these customers can be charged higher prices
1
. Therefore as the 
product matures it will be offered to a combination of existing and new customers and the 
                                                 
1
 For deposit accounts a higher price to depositors equates to a lower interest rate.  
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product price will rise. In the context of a deposit market, when a deposit account is being 
offered for the first time, all depositors will be new depositors and a higher or premium 
interest rate is expected. If the deposit account is relatively mature and has been offered to the 
market for many months it will be used by a mixture of new and existing depositors. Lower 
interest rates will therefore be expected on more mature deposit accounts. Further discussion 
of switching models are provided by the Office of Fair Trading (2003, 2010, hereafter OFT)  
 
Assessment of this theoretical explanation of deposit interest rate setting behaviour is 
important for a range of reasons. First, repeated government backed competition policy 
investigations in the European Union (hereafter EU), the UK and Australia, have reported 
bank customers are reluctant to switch banks (e.g. European Commission Director General 
for Competition 2007 [hereafter DG COMP], Independent Commission in Banking 2011 
[hereafter ICB], (the Australian) Senate Economics References Committee 2011) and that 
improving levels of customer switching enhances competition in retail banking markets. 
While markets with low levels of switching may or may not be competitive (see Viard 2007) 
the presence of real or perceived switching costs has long been viewed to be a barrier to 
entry, restricting competition in banking markets (OFT 2010). This study contributes to this 
on-going policy debate by examining a banking market characterised by low customer 
switching; the response of firms to this environment and whether interest rate setting is 
significantly influenced by the maturity of the financial services offered to customers. 
 
Secondly, interest rate setting for many financial services, and particularly deposits, has been 
viewed as ‘sluggish’, ‘sticky’, or lagged (e.g. Hannan and Berger 1991, Fuertes and 
Heffernan 2009) and characterised by high levels of variance (Ashton and Letza 2003, 
Martin-Oliver et al 2008) suggesting factors other than cost influence the setting of interest 
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rates. As it is often assumed that changes in base rates are transmitted to retail interest rates 
and then into the real economy relatively swiftly, further empirical evidence as to factors, 
such as low customer switching which may be influencing deposit interest rate setting and the 
ultimate speed of transmitting monetary policy actions has a wider importance.  
 
Lastly, determining what influences depositor switching has a real importance for banks, as 
‘core’ deposits are a stable form of bank financing (e.g. Cornett et al 2011, Huang and 
Ratnovski 2009) and are important within current and future regulatory regimes (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). Higher deposit levels and equity funding, and 
particularly core deposit funding as a proportion of all funding, is significantly associated 
with increased lending (Cornett et al 2011). Indeed most of the US credit contraction during 
and after 2007 is attributed to reductions of wholesale funding rather than retail deposits. 
  
The empirical assessment of the research questions is undertaken using a large and 
disaggregated data set of instant access deposit interest rates offered by UK firms between 
January 1989 and December 2011. We report the age of deposit accounts has a significant 
negative influence on interest rate setting with older or mature deposit accounts offering 
lower interest rates. Further, the newest deposit in a firms’ deposit account portfolio has 
significantly higher interest rates. The consumer costs arising from this form of interest rate 
setting are seen to be high. Interest rate setting behaviour also varies significantly by the type 
of firm offering the deposit account. It is concluded interest rate setting in the UK instant 
access deposit market is consistent with distinct interest rate setting for new and existing 
customers, firms extracting rent from existing depositors and behaving in accordance with the 
predictions of Klemperer (1995).  
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The study is structured in five sections. After this introduction a brief review of pertinent 
literatures is provided. In section three, the data and methods of analysis are outlined and 
section four provides the results of the empirical assessment. Conclusions and 
recommendations are provided in section five.   
 
2. Literature Review  
While the academic and policy literatures addressing customer switching in banking markets 
are large, this literature may be usefully sub-divided. Initially, many regulatory studies have 
surveyed customer switching activity in different banking markets. Secondly, an academic 
literature has examined why low levels of customer switching emerge in banking markets.  
2.1   Survey evidence of customer switching in retail banking.  
Investigation of the levels of customer switching in banking markets has attracted repeated 
attention and many surveys have been undertaken to quantify levels of customer switching. 
Customer switching in current (checking) account markets has been most frequently 
examined. Across the EU 25 member states in 2005, more concentrated banking markets 
such as the Netherlands and Finland have faced lower switching rates than nations with less 
concentrated banking markets such as Germany and Spain (DG Comp 2007). In the UK the 
percentage of customers switching each year has varied from 6% in 2006 (OFT 2008) to 
3.8% in 2010 (ICB 2011).  
 
In credit markets evidence of low customer switching is also reported. For the UK the ICB 
(2011) reported 4% of mortgage customers switched their provider in 2010, falling from over 
10% of customers in the mid 2000’s. Estimates of low customer switching are also reported 
for deposit or savings markets internationally. Kiser (2002) reported that the median 
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depositor holds their account for 10 years in the USA. In the UK the percentage of depositors 
switching their bank was reported to be less than 6% in 2010 (ICB 2011). The level of 
customer switching in retail banking markets is also lower than that observed in other retail 
financial services markets and other utility markets such as energy or telephony services 
(Morgans 2010, OFT 2008).    
2.2   Why is consumer switching in retail banking markets so low?   
Why consumer switching is so low in these markets has also been repeatedly investigated. 
This literature can be divided between three banking services: current accounts, credit 
services and deposits.   
 
Considering current accounts most attention has focused on administrative costs, price 
complexity and cross-selling (DG COMP 2007). The ability of banks to move automated 
payment arrangements such as direct debits or standing orders without incident is a point of 
particular customer concern and scepticism (DG COMP 2007, ICB 2011). Policy attention 
has also been placed on making comparison of current accounts easier for consumers (e.g. 
European Commission Health and Consumer Directorate General 2012). Subsequently many 
policy solutions to reduce transactional costs associated with switching banking services have 
been proposed and applied from the use of redirection services and enhanced customer 
information (ICB 2011) to the introduction of common procedures and deadlines for 
transferring accounts between banks (DG COMP 2007).  
 
In credit markets different factors are viewed to influence customer switching costs including 
information disclosure by banks to credit bureaux (Rajan 1992) and the process through 
which lenders disclose information to credit bureau (Bouckaert and Degryse 2004). The 
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presence of informational rents and customer ‘lock in’ arising has been empirically tested in 
many credit markets including US credit cards (Stango 2002) and the provision of firm 
finance (e.g. Kim et al 2003, Barone et al 2011). It is reported the influence of switching 
costs is significant and adds considerably to the costs of lending.  
 
The factors influencing customer switching in instant access deposit markets are different 
from those influencing switching in current account and credit markets. Distinct from current 
accounts, instant access deposit accounts are a relatively homogeneous service, have a simple 
pricing structure where the benefits of this service are indicated by a single interest rate, are 
relatively easy to switch and do not carry exit fees. Many of the explanations of low 
switching forwarded for credit markets such as information disclosure have limited 
applicability for deposit markets. Indeed as Shy (2002) reports determining the scale of 
switching costs in deposit markets is challenging due to the customer specific nature of these 
costs.  
3. Data and Methodology 
This section begins by considering how the empirical approach adopted in this study differs 
from current methods of assessing bank responses to low customer switching. Next, the 
dataset of UK instant access deposit accounts is introduced followed by explanation of how 
the descriptive and econometric analysis of the research questions is conducted. 
  
3.1. Developments to past methods.  
The approach employed to quantify deposit interest rate setting for markets characterised by 
low customer switching differs from past approaches (e.g. Sharpe 1997, Hannan and Adams 
2011 and Carbo-Valverde et al 2011) in a number of regards. These studies have examined 
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the proportion of in-migration into different geographical regions to determine if regions are 
characterised by relatively more or fewer new depositors.  
 
In this study a product level dataset is used to examine whether new and existing customers 
are offered distinct levels of interest by deposit accounts. This dataset enables aspects of the 
Klemperer (1995) model to be considered, which previously has not been possible. First, the 
number of deposit accounts offered by an individual firm and the presence of, and interest 
rate setting for, duplicate or very similar deposit accounts are identified. This enables the 
examination of the influence of the maturity or age of individual deposit accounts on interest 
rates setting and also the presence or otherwise of an interest rate premium on the newest 
deposit account. This development overcomes concerns raised by Carbo-Valverde et al 
(2011) as to the use of blended or aggregate interest rates.   
 
A second development is that deposit account characteristics can be considered in more detail 
including the type of firm offering the deposit account and the sum deposited, so quantifying 
the affect that these characteristics have on the interest rate. Lastly, while the approach of 
Sharpe (1997) is well suited to banking markets which can be geographically separated such 
as the USA and Spain, this form of analysis is not possible when banking markets are 
centralised and possess a more national character (see Ashton 2001). The use of product level 
data overcomes this concern.  
 
It should be stated the use of product level data also has drawbacks. Unlike Carbo-Valverde 
et al (2011) the number of new and existing depositors which actually use deposit accounts 
and the market share of different banks is not known.  
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3.2. Data employed in the study  
The data used is provided by MoneyFacts PLC. This UK based company has collated and 
published interest rate data on a range of financial services available in the UK since 1988 in 
a monthly magazine. This retail interest rate data for loans, mortgages and savings products is 
widely used by the financial press, the financial services industry, regulators and more 
recently by the academic research community. The interest rate data covers available deposit 
accounts
2
 for the period January 1989 until December 2011, denoted by a time-index 
{ }1,...,t T=  for 276 months. As this survey has matured, the dataset has become increasingly 
representative of the UK deposit market. While other research has used MoneyFacts data, the 
time-span and market coverage represented by our particular dataset is unique
3
. 
 
The analysis is simplified by limiting the deposit accounts in the dataset to instant access 
branch based accounts
4
. Branch based accounts are only selected as interest rate setting for 
remote access telephone and internet deposit accounts is likely to be very different which 
could distort the analysis and these accounts may even be viewed as a distinct product 
market. The selected branch based instant access deposit accounts are indexed { }1,...,i n=  
for 572 deposit accounts recorded over the sample period (1989 to 2011). 
 
The interest rate offered depends upon the sum or balance deposited, giving rise to ‘tiered’ 
interest rate structures. These tiers do not represent interest intervals, rather thresholds for the 
interest rate: when the balance of the account passes the threshold the whole balance receives 
                                                 
2
 Accounts which are classed as “closed issues” i.e. not open for new investment, are not included in our dataset. 
As the data is used to examine the choice faced by a depositor at any point in time, the exclusion of closed issue 
accounts does not distort the analysis. 
3
 Other studies which have used smaller scale samples of the MoneyFacts data include: Ashton (2001), 
Heffernan (2002), Ashton and Letza (2003), Ashton and Hudson (2008), Fuertes and Heffernan (2009).,  
4
 Although instant access is permitted for some notice accounts, this often incurs a financial penalty typically 
equal to an amount of interest equal to the days’ notice forgone. As this penalty factor is not included in this 
assessment these accounts are excluded. 
11 
 
interest at the new threshold rate. The MoneyFacts data consists of rates for nine total balance 
tiers, ranging from £1 to £100,000 but this analysis will focus on just three of these – the rate 
paid on a small initial investment of £500, on a medium investment of £5,000 and on a large 
investment of £50,000. Accordingly, two dummy variables are created, 5 itbal k   and 50 itbal k  
which will capture the difference in rate paid for a balance of £5,000 and £50,000 
respectively, compared to the rate of a £500 deposit (the base category).  
 
In the descriptive assessment the distribution of interest rates offered on deposit accounts is 
quantified by quartile. Deposit accounts are identified as being within the top quartile (Q1), 
upper-middle quartile (Q2), lower-middle (Q3), or bottom quartile (Q4) of the interest rate 
distribution of all deposit accounts at each point in time. Using this identifier it is possible to 
examine how the percentage of accounts which fall in to each of these quartiles is correlated 
with various factors including deposit account age, whether the deposit account is the newest 
within the firms’ deposit portfolio or firm type. 
 
3.3.   Econometric Analysis 
To explore research question 1 the total number of months each deposit account has been 
available to new depositors is calculated. Direct analysis of this variable is complicated as 
deposit accounts are unobservable prior to January 1989. To overcome this and possible 
issues of collinearity with variables used to explore research question 2, this variable is 
translated into a binary dummy taking the value 1 where the account has been observed for 
more than 30 months. This variable effectively identifies ‘mature’ accounts and is denoted 
itage . To avoid any truncation issues the sample analysed begins in November 1992 ensuring 
‘mature’ accounts are always recorded. 
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To explore research question 2 two binary dummy variables are created. The first denoted 
itnewest  takes the value 1 if the account is the newest in the firm’s deposit account portfolio. 
The second variable is denoted itprods and takes the value 1 if the firm offers a number of 
deposit accounts above that typically observed in the data; approximately 4 accounts
5
. This 
variable is included as a control for when firms offer relatively low or high numbers of 
deposit accounts, as the length of the ‘product line’ or scope of the product portfolio has been 
previously associated with pricing in financial services markets (see Iyengar and Kamenica 
2010 and Kamenica 2008). 
 
The analysis also allows for heterogeneity according to firm type, namely whether the firm is 
mutually owned (mutual banks are termed ‘building societies’ in the UK) or otherwise, and 
whether it is a large bank with a national branch network, or a small, regional bank. These 
two dummies are denoted ibank  
and isize  respectively. ibank  takes the value 1 if the firm is 
not a mutual and isize  takes the value 1 if the firm is a small size with only a local or regional 
branch coverage. Also including an interaction of these binary dummy variables will capture 
all types of firm available in our data: large mutuals, large banks, small banks and small 
mutuals.  
 
A full set of binary survey month dummy variables, collectively denoted ttime , is generated 
to allow temporal variation in the underlying interest rate environment to be accommodated. 
As the UK interest rate environment is dynamic it is important to examine if the firm and 
account characteristics, and so interest rate setting behaviour of the firm, is constant over 
                                                 
5
 Accounts which are from established firms at the beginning of the sample are not coded as newest, though all 
accounts from new firm start-ups introduced during the sample period are, until a newer account supersedes 
them. 
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time.  For example, the interest rates paid on new versus mature deposit accounts could differ 
over time, as could the impact of say a mutual (building society) account versus that offered 
by a bank. To address this possibility the dataset is split into three time periods based on the 
Bank of England base rate. The first time period is the high interest rate period between 
November 1992 and January 2001
6
 when the base rate fluctuated between 5 and 7.5%. The 
second time period is when interest rates were generally lower (between 4% and 6%) 
between February 2001 to October 2008. The final time period covers a time of world-wide 
low interest rates (around 1%) and a period when some banks have required additional 
deposit finding (November 2008 to December 2011).  A base month is chosen in each period 
(September 1993, April 2007 and October 2010 respectively) in the subsequent analysis, so 
avoiding exact collinearity of the time dummies with the constant term
7
. 
 
A drawback of the descriptive analysis is that the results could be influenced by a number of 
factors such as type of firm and the number of duplicate deposit accounts offered at any one 
time. Indeed the results could reflect strategic or competitive positioning by different types of 
firms, so some account needs to be taken for both prevailing macroeconomics conditions, and 
firm and product characteristics, to allow a measurement of ceteris paribus effect. The 
following model is proposed which allows for such an assessment:  
 
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
5 50
        
it it it it it it
i i i i it
rate bal k bal k newest age prods
bank size bank size u
β β β β β β
β β β
= + + + + +
+ + + × + +tγtime
  (0) 
 
The model is estimated for each of the three time periods which allows for heterogeneity 
between the sub-periods periods in the estimated  β  coefficients. This is important as 
                                                 
6
 The very beginning of the sample, January 1989 to October 1992, was excluded to reduce bias in the age 
dummy variable, and also since interest rates were much higher in this period compared with the period post 
November 1992. 
7
 This is chosen to minimise the size of the date dummy coefficient values. 
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coefficients may or may not be stable in all base rate regimes. The specification assumes that 
macroeconomic influences captured in γ are independent of the balance invested, and for 
ease of interpretation, restricts account specific effects to be the same across all types of firm. 
 
An account specific unobserved fixed effect is also included, and the model estimated using 
cluster-specific random effects (CSRE) in the sense of Cameron and Trivedi (2005), which is 
valid under the same assumptions as a GLS based RE estimating procedure
8
. This is 
necessary since the time-series of product specific interest rates is correlated in that the level 
of the interest rate following a change is constrained by the rate history for that product. If a 
product (or suite of products) were introduced to fulfil a particular funding need, for example, 
the account specific effect would be positive, and identical across time for this product(s). 
 
Given the distribution of interest rates over time is non-normal
9
 the use of standard 
asymptotic inference may be misleading. Accordingly, all estimated statistics are 
bootstrapped with 500 replications using a cluster robust bootstrap technique accommodating 
the individual deposit account effects in the resampling routine.  
 
The base firm category from which all coefficients measure differentials is a large mutual, 
while the base account type is a standard deposit account which is less than 31 months old, is 
not the newest account offered by the firm and is from a deposit account portfolio containing 
fewer than 5 similar accounts, with an initial investment of £500. 
 
                                                 
8
 In effect, the error component in (0) is actually it i itu α ε= +  where iα  is the account specific fixed effect. 
This specification allows for other product-level fixed effects to be directly measured (such as firm type effects) 
and has the benefit over standard RE of accommodating within cluster heteroskedasticity. This is implemented 
in Stata 11.0 using the Rogers (1993) methodology.  
9
 The truncation of the interest rate distribution at 0 will heavily contribute to this non-normality. 
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4. Results  
This section reports the descriptive and econometric results and is concluded with estimation 
of the depositor costs resulting from the observed interest rate setting behaviours of firms. 
Descriptive results are reported in Tables 1 to 4 and Figure 1. Summary statistics of the 
dataset are provided in Table 1. Tables 2 to 4 examine deposit account performance by 
considering the level of interest offered on a deposit account using quartiles of the interest 
rate distribution of all accounts within each time period. Table 2 reports deposit account 
performance compared to the age of the deposit account and Table 3 compares interest rate 
performance relative to whether the account is the newest in the firms’ deposit account 
portfolio. In Table 4 deposit account performance is considered relative to firm type to 
ascertain if firm level heterogeneity is influential. Lastly the distribution over time of interest 
rates offered on accounts for different sums deposited or tiers is summarised in Figure 1. The 
econometric assessment is reported in Table 5 and in Table 6 we report estimates of interest 
rate setting behaviour for the nine models controlling for the influence of firm type.  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics within each of the three time periods, split by the three 
sums deposited.  
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Table 1: General Summary Statistics 
  £500 deposited 
  Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
  Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
No of deposit accounts 96.86 24.77 125.91 5.47 128.87 6.27 
No of firms 73.10 8.29 68.06 2.64 67.47 1.86 
No of products offered by each firm 2.08 0.76 4.49 0.57 3.92 0.23 
Average age of product 43.17 9.05 76.45 11.80 86.28 3.87 
Average 25th percentile rate 2.07 0.54 1.38 0.58 0.19 0.31 
Average 50th percentile rate 3.20 0.74 2.58 0.74 0.56 0.68 
Average 75th percentile rate 3.92 0.69 3.82 0.88 1.73 0.74 
Months in period 99 93 38 
  £5,000 deposited 
  Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
  Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
No of deposit account 117.38 31.12 147.27 8.28 151.74 6.65 
No of firms 81.64 8.52 74.96 2.56 74.58 2.07 
No of products offered by each firm 2.12 0.74 4.38 0.50 3.84 0.23 
Average age of product 43.30 9.55 74.91 10.38 80.36 3.38 
Average 25th percentile rate 3.20 0.84 1.96 0.72 0.25 0.50 
Average 50th percentile rate 3.92 0.73 3.30 0.62 0.75 0.73 
Average 75th percentile rate 4.78 0.68 4.16 0.77 1.89 0.78 
Months in period 99 93 38 
  £50,000 deposited 
  Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
  Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
No of deposit accounts 119.70 30.81 149.17 8.56 153.03 7.10 
No of firms 81.73 8.52 75.05 2.56 74.58 2.07 
No of products offered by each firm 2.13 0.73 4.36 0.50 3.85 0.22 
Average age of product 43.05 9.55 74.41 10.27 79.80 3.56 
Average 25th percentile rate 4.20 0.79 2.73 0.63 0.42 0.60 
Average 50th percentile rate 4.83 0.75 3.64 0.61 0.99 0.73 
Average 75th percentile rate 5.61 0.72 4.37 0.72 2.02 0.74 
Months in period 99 93 38 
 
Considering £500 deposited there were on average 97 instant access branch-based deposit 
accounts during the first period (November 1992 – January 2001). During the subsequent 
time periods this number of deposit accounts has increased markedly. The standard-deviation 
reports the largest fluctuations in the numbers of deposit accounts occurred during the first 
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time period. The number of firms offering instant access branch deposit services has 
remained relatively consistent over the entire sample period at between 75 and 82 firms. On 
average, the number of deposit accounts offered by each firm rises from an average of around 
2 to 4 deposit accounts and the average age of a deposit account increases between the first 
and second time periods. 
 
Rows 5 to 7 of Table 1 show the differences in the interest rate environment in the 3 time 
periods. A graphical representation of the distribution of the data in each tier is shown by the 
sunflower plots
10
 in Figure 1, each of which is overlaid by a graph of the Bank of England 
base rate.  
Figure 1: Tiered Interest Rate Distributions through Time 
 
                                                 
10
 Flowers (coloured circles) represent density of observations, with more petals (lines within the flowers) and 
deeper coloured flowers representing increasingly higher densities, as shown by the legend. See Dupont and 
Plummer (2003) for more details. 
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Until recently, the bulk of observations in each tier has been below the base rate, though for 
higher tiers, the difference between the base rate and the modal observation is smaller, 
suggesting a rightwards shift in the overall probability distribution function of rates across 
tiers. The distribution would also appear to have become more leptokurtic through time, with 
a higher density of observations around the mean. 
 
An analysis of deposit account age versus interest rate performance is shown in Table 2. Here 
the quartiles of the deposit account interest rate distribution for the three time periods are 
compared to the age of the deposit account in years; for accounts which are one year old, 
between 2 and 5 years old and over 6 years old. The percentage of all deposit accounts within 
these three ‘age’ groups is reported.  
 
In Table 2 a clear pattern emerges that the age of a deposit account is negatively correlated 
with the interest rates offered. The percentage of deposit accounts in quartile 1 representing 
the most competitive deposit accounts decreases with account age for all sums deposited in 
all time periods. A very similar pattern is seen when quartiles 1 and 2 are considered together. 
In contrast, the percentage of deposit accounts in quartile 4, representing the least competitive 
accounts, increases with account age for all sums deposited in all time periods. In all cases 
deposit accounts which are over 6 years old are clustered in the bottom two quartiles of 
interest rates offered. This tabulation therefore lends support to research question 1; more 
mature or older deposit accounts have lower interest rates.  
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Table 2: Deposit Account Performance versus Age of Deposit Account 
Age of deposit account / 
Interest rate distribution 
£500 deposited 
Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
1 yr. 2–5 yrs. 6+ yr.s 1 yr. 2–5 yrs 6+ yr.s 1 yr. 2–5 yr.s 6+ yr.s 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 28.92% 20.57% 15.74% 23.15% 19.33% 3.69% 29.20% 17.58% 6.82% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 26.86% 27.05% 27.83% 34.62% 31.23% 15.46% 29.13% 29.89% 18.22% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 22.89% 28.28% 26.50% 31.67% 33.35% 32.31% 30.60% 45.22% 57.40% 
Q4 (Lowest) 21.33% 24.10% 29.93% 10.56% 16.09% 48.54% 11.07% 7.31% 17.55% 
χ
2
(9) 186.63 16893.19 6538.83 
£5,000 deposited 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 23.07% 12.48% 7.27% 29.79% 15.90% 4.11% 34.94% 15.99% 5.82% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 28.58% 29.65% 28.35% 30.72% 31.30% 11.39% 28.71% 30.44% 15.75% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 20.00% 27.96% 35.66% 26.78% 34.97% 29.76% 27.92% 41.30% 53.90% 
Q4 (Lowest) 28.35% 29.91% 28.72% 12.71% 17.83% 54.75% 8.43% 12.27% 24.53% 
χ
2
 (9) 2767.72 14573.49 12555.43 
£50,000 deposited 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 21.89% 13.59% 7.03% 30.45% 15.99% 5.51% 32.35% 14.35% 6.38% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 27.51% 27.94% 33.07% 31.97% 31.17% 9.41% 32.87% 36.09% 19.60% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 20.87% 27.94% 35.01% 24.86% 34.76% 31.47% 18.94% 23.95% 35.49% 
Q4 (Lowest) 29.72% 30.54% 24.88% 12.73% 18.08% 53.61% 15.84% 25.61% 38.53% 
χ
2
 (9) 2083.96 22620.16 12172.52 
Notes: 
Highlighting signifies the largest percentage in each quartile across the categories in each time period. 
Percentages represent the average percentage of deposit accounts, at each point in time which fall in to that 
category – hence columns add to 100%. The χ
2 
statistic relates to the hypothesis of joint equality of all 
independent cells in each period 
Table 3 shows deposit account interest rate quartiles relative to whether the account is the 
newest in the deposit account portfolio offered by the firm. The table provides evidence that 
the newest accounts provide more competitive interest rates. The percentage of the newest 
accounts in quartile 1, the most competitive quartile, exceeds the percentage of other 
accounts in that quartile in every time period and for every sum deposited. The percentage of 
the newest accounts in quartile 4, the most uncompetitive quartile, is generally less than the 
percentage of the other accounts. Similarly, when quartiles 3 and 4 are considered together 
the newer accounts appear less frequently in almost every case. Overall this table lends 
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support to research question 2; the newest deposit account in a firms’ deposit account 
portfolio pays an interest rate premium. 
 
Table 3: Deposit Account Performance for Newest Deposit Account in Firms’ Portfolio 
 Newest account / Interest 
rate distribution  
£500 deposited 
Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 22.38% 19.12% 17.17% 10.46% 24.00% 8.70% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 25.54% 27.24% 29.38% 22.25% 28.94% 21.32% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 29.68% 26.34% 30.20% 31.95% 37.06% 55.69% 
Q4 (Lowest) 22.40% 27.30% 23.25% 35.35% 10.01% 14.29% 
χ
2
(6) 132.32 2805.09 7460.37 
  £5,000 deposited 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 16.67% 11.36% 19.28% 9.16% 22.79% 8.93% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 24.30% 29.53% 22.58% 21.11% 27.65% 20.89% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 28.55% 29.17% 33.20% 29.87% 35.16% 51.25% 
Q4 (Lowest) 30.47% 29.94% 24.94% 39.86% 14.41% 18.94% 
χ
2
(6) 1250.55 3806.62 10452.39 
  £50,000 deposited 
Q1 (Highest Quartile) 17.07% 11.68% 19.68% 9.88% 20.50% 9.28% 
Q2 (Higher Middle) 28.71% 28.49% 25.93% 18.22% 34.34% 24.12% 
Q3 (Lower Middle) 22.85% 30.62% 31.45% 31.79% 24.01% 31.47% 
Q4 (Lowest) 31.38% 29.21% 22.93% 40.11% 21.14% 35.13% 
χ
2
(6) 1124.11 3686.24 3937.42 
Notes: 
Highlighting signifies the largest percentage in each quartile across the categories in each time period. 
Percentages represent the average percentage of deposit accounts at each point in time, which fall into that 
category – hence columns add to 100%. The χ
2 
statistic relates to the hypothesis of joint equality of all 
independent cells in each period. 
 
Table 4 records the interest rates offered on deposit accounts by quartile relative to the 
different types of firm. On average, small banks have deposit accounts within the bottom 
quartile of the interest rate distribution (Q4). Conversely, large mutuals have a greater 
percentage of their deposit accounts in the top quartile of the interest rate distribution (Q1).  
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Table 4: Deposit Account Performance versus Firm Type 
  
Firm 
Type / 
Interest 
rate 
dist.  
£500 deposited 
Nov 1992 - Jan 2001 Feb 2001 - Oct 2008 Nov 2008 - Dec 2011 
Large 
mutual 
Small 
mutual 
Large 
bank 
Small 
bank 
Large 
mutual 
Small 
mutual 
Large 
bank 
Small 
bank 
Large 
mutual 
Small 
mutual 
Large 
bank 
Small 
bank 
Q1 24.34% 24.81% 9.10% 12.50% 21.82% 12.33% 7.13% 14.44% 22.28% 11.90% 9.86% 15.21% 
Q2 29.31% 31.36% 23.05% 11.51% 29.20% 36.41% 15.92% 14.58% 30.56% 36.10% 13.04% 17.47% 
Q3 22.37% 25.08% 33.11% 28.91% 26.05% 28.27% 34.32% 28.31% 22.74% 33.65% 24.30% 22.20% 
Q4 23.98% 18.76% 34.74% 47.09% 22.93% 22.99% 42.63% 42.67% 24.41% 18.35% 52.80% 45.11% 
χ
2
(12) 2791.28 4528.29 3850.86 
£5,000 deposited 
Q1 31.85% 7.84% 17.13% 10.87% 24.52% 9.94% 9.75% 12.09% 24.67% 10.95% 12.06% 8.34% 
Q2 27.25% 23.71% 30.29% 9.08% 33.65% 18.35% 33.23% 8.15% 33.41% 16.33% 30.38% 17.10% 
Q3 27.56% 35.96% 19.27% 21.00% 26.53% 34.06% 26.48% 20.85% 25.23% 33.95% 27.59% 30.50% 
Q4 13.35% 32.49% 33.31% 59.05% 15.30% 37.65% 30.54% 58.91% 16.69% 38.77% 29.97% 44.06% 
χ
2
(12) 5924.2 6638.32 6095.06 
£50,000 deposited 
Q1 22.24% 9.57% 26.21% 13.86% 20.88% 9.88% 24.40% 14.12% 22.44% 10.31% 21.10% 8.94% 
Q2 33.56% 20.56% 20.68% 33.67% 36.05% 19.53% 29.67% 19.85% 35.20% 25.16% 31.87% 27.56% 
Q3 40.39% 56.16% 37.41% 32.96% 36.93% 51.37% 31.05% 41.06% 14.57% 33.00% 22.17% 31.88% 
Q4 3.82% 13.71% 15.69% 19.50% 6.13% 19.22% 14.88% 24.97% 27.79% 31.53% 24.85% 31.62% 
χ
2
(12) 7031.17 10740.35 7931.7 
Notes: 
Highlighting signifies the largest percentage in each quartile across the categories in each time period. 
Percentages represent the average percentage of deposit accounts at each point in time, which fall in to that 
category – hence columns add to 100%. The χ
2 
statistic relates to the hypothesis of joint equality of all 
independent cells in each period. 
 
To conclude, this descriptive analysis indicates deposit account age, if the deposit account is 
the newest deposit account in the firms’ portfolio and firm type are all correlated with deposit 
interest rate setting. In the next section an econometric analysis is outlined allowing for tests 
of ceteris paribus effects having controlled for firm and deposit account factors. 
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4.2. Econometric evidence  
As discussed in section 3, three models are estimated to test the research questions. These 
models are estimated controlling for firm type heterogeneity, deposit account characteristics, 
and balance invested, with results reported in Table 5. 
 
Compared to a ‘regular’ account from a product range consisting of less than 5 accounts, 
where the product is neither newest  in the range nor more than 30 months old, a number of 
findings regarding product characteristics can be summarised from the results shown in Table 
5. Considering research question 1 the coefficient estimates for Age are statistically 
significant and negative in all cases. This confirms the finding that the rate paid is negatively 
correlated with age of the account – accounts over 30 months old pay a significantly smaller 
rate – and that this finding is robust across time and investment sizes. This mature account 
‘penalty’ when compared to a regular account is sizable, and is on average close to 0.5%. For 
research question 2, the Newest coefficient estimate is positive as expected, and is statistically 
significant (at the 10 percent level) in 8 of 9 cases. This confirms that the newest account in 
the product portfolio generally pays a rate premium, which compared to a regular account, is 
around 0.3%, again a sizable amount of ‘benefit’. The coefficient estimates for Prods 
(denoting if the firm offers an above average number of deposit accounts) positive in all 
cases, and is significant (at the 5 percent level) in 8 out of 9 cases. An account in a portfolio 
of more than 4 products is therefore likely to be offered at a premium of around 0.4% on 
average, compared to a regular account. 
  
23 
 
Table 5: Interest Rate Setting Behaviour Model Estimates 
Panel A: Nov 
1992 - Jan 2001 
£500 £5,000 £50,000 
Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   
Newest 0.2601 (0.1716) 0.130   0.2583 (0.1352) 0.056 * 0.2019 (0.1038) 0.052 * 
Prods 0.7108 (0.2841) 0.012 ** 0.4861 (0.2194) 0.027 ** 0.0741 (0.2146) 0.730 
Age -0.3681 (0.1148) 0.001 *** -0.3206 (0.0931) 0.001 *** -0.1468 (0.0770) 0.057 * 
Large Bank -0.8305 (0.3292) 0.012 ** -0.9817 (0.2258) 0.000 *** -1.0542 (0.2618) 0.000 *** 
Small Mutual 0.0991 (0.2826) 0.726   0.3212 (0.1780) 0.071 * 0.3095 (0.1813) 0.088 * 
Small Bank -0.0357 (0.3255) 0.913   0.5369 (0.2799) 0.055 * 0.5926 (0.2961) 0.045 ** 
Constant 3.9404 (0.1616) 0.000 ***             
Differential         0.6173 (0.0969) 0.000 *** 1.4085 (0.1060) 0.000 *** 
Number of Obs 33060 
R
2
 0.4112 
Number of clusters 294 
Panel B: Feb 2001 
- Oct 2008 
£500 £5,000 £50,000 
Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   
Newest 0.3366 (0.1534) 0.028 ** 0.3330 (0.1464) 0.023 ** 0.2510 (0.1314) 0.056 * 
Prods 0.4789 (0.1468) 0.001 *** 0.5507 (0.1312) 0.000 *** 0.2961 (0.1091) 0.007 *** 
Age -0.6097 (0.1210) 0.000 *** -0.7848 (0.1192) 0.000 *** -0.7294 (0.1087) 0.000 *** 
Large Bank -0.8168 (0.3804) 0.032 ** -0.7812 (0.3254) 0.016 ** -0.6961 (0.3030) 0.022 ** 
Small Mutual 0.7938 (0.3168) 0.012 ** 0.7354 (0.2234) 0.001 *** 0.5779 (0.2069) 0.005 *** 
Small Bank 0.4751 (0.4995) 0.342   0.4022 (0.3868) 0.298   0.4812 (0.3677) 0.191 
Constant 2.8093 (0.1540) 0.000 ***             
Differential         0.5274 (0.1059) 0.000 *** 1.1284 (0.1224) 0.000 *** 
Number of Obs 39279 
R
2
 0.4107 
Number of clusters 324 
Panel C: Nov 2008 
- Dec 2011 
£500 £5,000 £50,000 
Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   Coef. Std. Err. P-Val.   
Newest 0.3486 (0.1835) 0.057 * 0.3104 (0.1444) 0.032 ** 0.3587 (0.1385) 0.010 ** 
Prods 0.2138 (0.0936) 0.022 ** 0.2182 (0.0991) 0.028 ** 0.2296 (0.1013) 0.023 ** 
Age -0.2994 (0.1693) 0.077 * -0.4828 (0.1471) 0.001 *** -0.4128 (0.1421) 0.004 *** 
Large Bank -0.2992 (0.2151) 0.164   -0.3030 (0.1967) 0.123   -0.2831 (0.1995) 0.156 
Small Mutual 0.4879 (0.1685) 0.004 *** 0.5458 (0.1550) 0.000 *** 0.4435 (0.1682) 0.008 *** 
Small Bank 0.4326 (0.2999) 0.149   0.3228 (0.2670) 0.227   0.2410 (0.2584) 0.351 
Constant 0.4159 (0.1722) 0.016 **             
Differential         0.2243 (0.0781) 0.004 *** 0.3465 (0.0884) 0.000 *** 
Number of Obs. 16478 
R
2
 0.3950 
Clusters 253 
  
Notes: The models estimated are shown by (0), employing CSRE and a cluster-robust bootstrap. The base 
category is a large mutual with a product range of less than 5 accounts, where the account is less than 31 months 
old and is not the newest product, and there is £500 invested. In panel A, the base month is September 1993, in 
panel B it is April 2007 while in panel C it is October 2010. This base product category is reflected in the 
constant term, from which all other coefficients measure departures. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. A full set of monthly dummy variables is included, with coefficient 
values excluded from the table above, but being shown graphically in Figure 2. 
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Results show that in addition to Age, Newness, and number of Products, firm effects are 
influential in interest rate setting. Relative to a large mutual bank, the coefficient estimate on 
Large Bank shows that these firm set interest rates statistically significantly lower in the first 
two periods (about 0.7% less on average across all time periods) and the coefficient estimate 
on Small Bank shows that these banks set interest rates higher (0.4% more, on average). In 
the last period, the coefficient estimate on Small Mutual shows that these firms offer a rate 
premium (0.5% across on average across all time periods) perhaps suggesting that 
competition has driven margins lower and reduced variation in pricing across firm types. On 
average, these firm effects suggest that there is a distinct cost associated with limited 
consumer search – considering only high street firms has a negative impact on rates if only 
high street banks are approached, and ignoring smaller firms which do not operate on all high 
streets, ignores the sizable rate advantage such firms offer. 
 
Lastly, while the differential for the constant term shows the reward for holding larger 
deposit balances has reduced through time (with the base rate) there is still a statically 
significant difference between rates offered for the at the £5,000 and £50,000 tiers, (showed 
by the Differential coefficient estimates) compared to the £500 tier (showed by the Constant 
term coefficient estimates for the base period). This is not surprising as firms are likely to be 
passing on the lower cost involved in administering accounts with larger balances  in the 
form of higher rates paid on such balances. 
 
The γ  date dummy coefficients estimates which capture macroeconomic effects through time 
are plotted as a bar chart in Figure 2 against the prevailing Bank of England base rate. These 
coefficients measure the difference between the constant term in the base period with all 
other periods in the sample. Although these coefficients are estimated separately on the three 
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sub-samples, they are shown together for compactness, separated by a vertical line. Figure 2 
shows that these date differentials are predominantly negative, meaning the average rate in 
each period is often lower than in the base period (reflected by the constant term). It is 
interesting to note falls in the base rate appear to lead to a corresponding future fall in the 
date coefficient values of larger magnitude than rises in the base rate do, suggesting upward 
stickiness in product interest rates. It should be noted that although the confidence interval 
shows most date effects are significant, though this will not change the significance of the 
differentials in terms of product or firm characteristics described previously. The graph 
confirms, as should be expected, that a primary driver in the movement of retail interest rates 
is the base rate. 
 
Figure 2: Survey Month Dummy Coefficient Values 
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The costs of these identified interest rate setting practices are economically significant for 
individual depositors. The descriptive analysis shows that the difference between a good 
(upper quartile) and bad (lower quartile) account is approximately 2% for accounts with an 
opening balance of £500 or more and 1.5% for accounts with an opening balance of £5,000 or 
£50,000 (over a year these would indicate monetary benefits of £10, £75 and £750 
respectively).  The monetary benefits of switching accounts accruing over even a short period 
of time for the accounts with larger balances are large compared to the task costs involved in 
searching for and switching to a new deposit account.
11
.  
 
4.3 Summary of results  
Overall the analysis has taken a two-stage approach. First a descriptive analysis found 
evidence for deposit account age and the newest deposit account having negative and positive 
relationships with interest rate setting respectively. A second approach uses an econometric 
model to examine ceteris paribus effects and confirms that deposit account age, ‘newness’ 
and number of similar products are key determinants of deposit interest rates, with a clear 
role for firm type in product pricing mechanisms. Interest rate setting behaviour in the UK 
retail instant access deposit market is consistent, therefore, with the research questions, and 
so supportive of the Klemperer (1995) model. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines deposit interest rate setting within a market characterised by low levels 
of customer switching and assesses if banks extract rent from their existing depositors. Two 
research questions are examined: do more mature accounts attract lower interest rates and 
                                                 
11
  Previous work estimating search costs in various consumer markets (see for example, Hong and Shum, 2006) 
shows them to be of the order of a few tens of pounds at most.  
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does the newest account in the deposit account portfolio of a firm attract an interest rate 
premium? In an empirical assessment of a large sample of UK retail instant access deposit 
accounts between 1989 and 2011 both questions are borne out by the data. Older or more 
mature deposit accounts receive significantly lower interest rates and the newest deposit 
accounts offered by a firm receive significantly higher interest rates. In light of these 
findings, it is important to outline policy implications and offer potential solutions to remedy 
or alleviate these outcomes.   
 
The implications of differential interest rate setting for new and existing depositors as 
identified in this study are important from both prudential financial regulation and 
competition policy perspectives. From a prudential regulation perspective, it is important to 
allow banks access to a stable and low cost source of funding in the form of retail deposits 
which are held at the same bank over repeated time periods. The current low levels of 
depositor switching clearly assists this aim (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). 
While recognising the prudential benefits of low levels of deposit account switching, this 
market feature sits uncomfortably with the prevailing competition policy. Within the EU, 
competition policy indicates low depositor switching is a behaviour requiring change.  
 
How such inequitable and complex policy situations can be addressed has provoked 
considerable debate. It is often been proposed low depositor switching arises from 
unsophisticated and dis-interested depositors. Greater financial education is therefore widely 
advocated internationally to overcome this concern (see Fox and Hoffman 2004, Erturk et al 
2007). Such change in isolation will not resolve incentives for banks to develop perceptions 
that switching costs are high to benefit from customer inertia. Indeed if uninformed and dis-
interested depositors assist firm profitability the benefits of financial education can be limited 
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by firms (Subrahmanyam 2009) applying marketing policies of obfuscation (Carlin and 
Manso 2011) and increasing product complexity (Carlin 2008).   
 
Two changes supplementary to financial education are therefore proposed to improve returns 
received by existing depositors. Initially it is important for depositors to improve their 
decision making skills and enhance switching in this market. To engender this outcome 
increasing the number of market decisions may be helpful. Therefore informing customers 
regularly of the interest rates of deposit accounts both held and also provided by the 
incumbent bank would assist this process. Such information provision allowing a 
comparative comparison of the banks deposit interest rates would encourage switching of 
deposit accounts within the firm. Secondly, a process where a depositor could opt to have 
their funds automatically switched to the best interest rate offered by the deposit provider 
would also provide advantages to many customers. Such a change would reduce the 
differential between new and existing customers, while retaining the prudential benefits of 
depositors remaining with the same firm over prolonged period of time. We acknowledge this 
change involves greater interest costs for firms which set interest rates in the manner 
observed in this study. To conclude this is clearly an area for further research both 
internationally and within other banking markets.  
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